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In this paper, it was made an exhaustive survey of the literature related with cost and 
production frontiers in the water and sanitation sector. The survey shed light in order to 
determine the variables to choose in the model to be estimated in a further empirical 
estimation developed for the Latin American Region by the authors. 
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A detailed overview of the literature was done, to recognize the set of variables that have 
been included en previous studies. The survey also was useful to think other variables not 
previously studied and to apply them to the estimates. In the survey it was applied a double 




                                                 
7 After its privatization in 1989, the water and sewerage industry of England and Wales faced a new RPI+K 
regulatory price cap, a system that is a variant of the typical RPI-X regulation regime in the UK. The 
regulation was designed both to encourage increased efficiency and also provide funding for the substantial 
capital investments, which were necessitated by the tightening of environmental and drinking water standards 
after privatization. In RPI+K formula, K is –X+Q. X represents the amount by which each company has to 
reduce costs in real terms, and Q reflects the expenditure necessary to meet the higher quality levels set by the 
European Community directive on water quality. The efficiency factor, X, reflects OFWAT’s assessment of 
each company’s scope to reduce its unit costs over a five year period, and a Q factor to reflect higher costs 
resulting from meeting stricter water quality standards. Water quality is policed by the Drinking Water 
Inspectorate (DWI) and the Environmental Agency (EA).  
The industry has had to undertake much capital expenditure to meet the new water quality requirements and 
to make up for a large backlog of investment needs while under state ownership. Therefore, in the ten years 
following privatization, the K factor in the price cap was positive, leading to sharply higher water and 
sewerage service prices for consumers. However, in the price determinations for the 2000-2005 periods, the 
companies were required to reduce their prices by an average of 2.1 percent per annum over the 
quinquennium. The WaSCs and the WoCs have combined annual revenue of almost 7 billion pounds a year, 
of which between 40 percent and 50 percent is to meet environmental requirements set by either national 
government or the EU. By contrast, the volume of water and sewerage output supplied has been fairly static 
with an average annual growth rate of only 0.7 percent since 1990. The WaSCs provide water supply, water 
treatment and water distribution for near 80% of all connected properties in England and Wales, alongside all 
sewerage treatment, collection and disposal. They also account for 60% of the industry’s investment. WoCs 
declined from the original 29 to 20 in 1993, and to 12 currently, through a combination of takeovers by 
WaSCs or mergers with other WoCs. By 2003, the WaSCs accounted for about 81% of connected customers, 
82% of water volumes delivered as well as 100% of sewerage properties served. 
While average annual OPEX productivity growth has declined moderately from 2.92 to 1.76 percent over 
1993-2003, regulatory tightening appears to have had a small statistically significant positive impact on 
OPEX productivity growth. Saal and Reid (2004) results suggest that overall WaSC OPEX productivity 
growth rates have not been detrimentally influenced by improved drinking water and environmental quality 
standards. 
The rationale for the structure of regulation for the industry can be explained in terms of the three sources of 
market failure commonly observed in water and sewerage sectors: monopoly power, asymmetric information 
about product quality and environmental externalities. Since its first review in 1994, OFWAT has developed a 
comparative competition approach based on econometric modelling of unit costs to inform the setting of its X 
factors. These are based on a proportion of the company-specific scope for efficiency improvement identified 
through the comparative assessments, although  the detail of OFWAT’s methodology has changed at 
successive price reviews in 1994, 1999 and 2004 in line with its judgement about the incentives to improve 
efficiency. 
The economic regulation of the privatised water industry can be divided into distinct regulatory periods 
represented by the term of the successive price controls. In the first regulatory period from privatisation to 
1995, price caps were set by Government and not OFWAT. The average annual WaSC K factor for +5% per 
annum during this period was relatively lax, and was designed to ensure the success of the privatisation 
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In Price (1993), on the English and Wales industry, the relevant output indicator is WATER 
DELIVERD TO CLIENTS. DENSITY, measured as CONNECTIONS BY MAIN 
LENGTH, was not found significant as an explanatory variable. PUMPING was found 
positive associated with OPEX. For big consumptions two proxies were used: AVERAGE 
DISTRIBUTED VOLUME TO MEASURED NON-RESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES, and 
the WATER TO RESIDENTIAL CLIENTS/WATER TO ALL CLIENTS. Both variables 
were strongly correlated. For CAPITAL INPUT, there were used GROSS AND NET 
ASSET VALUES BY MAIN LENGTH and the ratio GROSS/NET ASSETS. There were 
not found significant relationship. To control by regional effects, there were used four 
REGIONAL DUMMIES. No one was significant. Peak demand was not considered. There 
was included one SEWERAGE DUMMY between WaSCs and WoCs. It was not 
significant. Quality of service and product were not included because of its 
multidimensionality and the lack of a satisfactory synthetic measure. 
  The more satisfactory model relates OPEX BY UNIT OF WATER DELIVERED, 
with PROPORTION OF WATER WITH MORE TREATMENT THAN A SIMPLE 
DISINFECTION, PROPORTION OF WASTE WATER WITH PRIMARY 
TREATMENT, AVERAGE PUMPING AS A PROPORTION OF WATER DELIVERED, 
the AVERAGE SIZE OF UNDERGROUND SOURCES weighted by the PROPORTION 
THAT UNDERGROUND WATER REPRESENTS ON THE TOTAL, PROPORTION OF 
MEASURED WATER DELIVERED TO NON RESIDENTIAL CLIENTS, and THE 
PROPORTION OF UNDERGROUND WATER WITH A SIMPLE DISINFECTION. 
  Stewart (1993) developed estimations of cost functions for the OFWAT system. As 
the principal explanatory variables they are advanced the LENGTH OF THE NETWORK 
and the VOLUME OF WATER DELIVERED, from standardised OFWAT measurements 
of distributed water. The proposed model explains OPEX as a function of LENGTH OF 
MAINS, VOLUME OF WATER DELIVERED, the AMOUNT OF BILLED 
PROPERTIES, WATER PUT IN THE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM and the MEASURED 
VOLUME OF WATER DISTRIBUTED TO NON RESIDENTIAL CLIENTS.  
Stewart (1994), studied sewerage costs in the OFWAT system in the period 1992-
93. The DIRECT COSTS OF SEWERAGE plus IMPUTED GENERAL AND 
MAINTENANCE EXPENSES are explained as a function of the VOLUME OF WASTE 
WATER and the LENGTH OF MAINS, the VOLUME OF DOMESTIC SEWERAGE 
                                                                                                                                                     
flotation. The 1994 price review set significantly tighter price caps with an average WaSC K factor of +1.4% 
for the period from 1996 to 2000. In the 1999 price review, price caps were further tightening and, for the first 
time, prices fell in real terms over the period 2001-2005 with average K factor of –1.5% per annum. The 
effective X factor for total opex expenditures for an average WaSC in the 1994, 1999, and 2004 reviews 
respectively averaged 2, 2.83 and 1.41%. 
The quality regulators play a pivotal role in OFWAT’s price setting process through its recommendation to 
Government on the scale of the required improvements. In practice, OFWAT’s policy has been to only make 
allowance in price limits for expenditure required to meet new standards where this is required by Ministerial 
guidance and the quality regulator has approved the investment projects or operational solutions proposed by 
the water companies. During the 1993 to 2003 period, WaSC investment relating to new drinking water 
quality standards has been of the order of 5.8 billion Pounds in 2003 prices or 31% of total capital investment 
in water supply for the same period. Investment to improve environmental quality has been overwhelmingly 
concentrated in the sewerage service to meet the requirements of EU water quality directives. In the period 
1993-2003 investment expenditure was around 9.4 billion Pounds in 2003 prices, or 48.2% of total sewerage 
capital investment over the same period. 
  5 
OUTPUT is proxied by the RATIO BETWEEN THE RESIDENTIAL CONNECTED 
POPULATION TO SEWERAGE SYSTEM, the AMOUNT OF POPULATION IN 
HOLIDAYS –important in some locations-, the ESTIMATED VOLUME OF 
COMMERCIAL WASTE WATER, also is considered the AVERAGE RAIN IN EACH 
AREA and the AREA itself. 
Bosworth, Stoneman and Thanassoulis (1996) extended Steward (1993 and 1994) in 
a number of directions. They examined the use of production and cost functions, discussed 
conceptual issues concerning the functional form to be chosen, measurement problems and 
the ideal type of data. The translog specification is selected, because of its properties: the 
scale elasticity varies with output level and the factor proportion, the elasticity of 
substitution also varies with the output level and the factor proportions, with some caveats 
it nests other more restrictive functional forms. 
Botasso and Conti (2003) analyzed the evolution of operating costs efficiency for 
the English and Welsh sanitation sector over the period 1995-2001, by estimating a 
stochastic cost frontier. The stochastic cost frontier approach modified in order to account 
for possible heteroskedasticity problems arising from large size differential in utilities. The 
main aim of the paper is to provide an overall picture of the industry cost inefficiency. This 
has been reduced in the time being, and differences between providers have narrowed. 
Privatisation took place in 1989. In 1995 the price cap formula was modified to introduce 
yardstick competition in the industry. 
The study used an unbalanced panel of 177 firm observations on WaSCs and WoCs 
over 1995-2001. They focused only on the water service. OPEX were estimated as a 
function of UNIT LABOUR COSTS, OUTPUT (proxied by the AMOUNT OF WATER 
DELIVERED), LENGTH OF MAINS, AVERAGE PUMPING HEADS, PROPORTION 
OF RIVER SOURCES ON TOTAL WATER DELIVERED, SHARE OF WATER 
DELIVERED TO NON-HOUSEHOLDS CUSTOMERS ON TOTAL WATER 
DELIVERED, POPULATION DENSITY, a proxy for FIRM’s SIZE: AMOUNT OF 
WATER INTRODUCED INTO THE DISTRIBUTION MAINS and the STOCK OF 
CAPITAL proxied by the MODERN EQUIVALENT ASSET ESTIMATION OF THE 
REPLACEMENT COSTS OF NET TANGIBLE ASSETS. 
They adopt a cost function approach since they assume that firms were price takers 
on inputs markets and that output is exogenously determined. In particular, they considered 
a variable cost function as they assume capital stock as a quasi-fixed input. The technology 
is modelled as a Tran logarithmic variable cost function. Some variables, which influence 
the technology, were included to account for exogenous differences in the environment: a 
SEWERAGE DUMMY and TIME DUMMIES were included. 
The sample has large firms’ size variations, which is likely to generate 
heteroskedasticity problems. In the three models estimated by ML, the coefficients of 
OUTPUT and WAGE elasticity are positive, as expected. Estimates of the cost elasticity 
with respect to CAPITAL were positive, but not significant. Positive cost elasticity with 
respect to AVERAGE PUMPING HEAD and RIVER SOURCES, show that those 
variables significantly raise variable costs. TIME varying intercepts are only significant and 
negative for 2000 and 2001, showing a downward shift of the cost frontier. The inclusion of 
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the SEWERAGE DUMMY reflects cost advantages for the joint production of water and 
sewerage products. 
Saal et al (2004) estimated a quality-adjusted input distance function, with 
stochastic frontier techniques, in order to estimate productivity growth rates for the period 
1985-2000. Productivity is decomposed so as to account for the impact of technical change, 
efficiency change, and scale change. These estimates allow a more careful consideration of 
how and whether privatization and the RPI+K system price cap regime affected 
productivity growth in the industry. They suggest that while technical change improved 
after privatization, productivity growth did not, thereby suggesting that firms struggled to 
keep up with technical advances in water services after privatization. Moreover, they also 
suggest that diseconomies of scale contributed negatively to productivity growth. 
Failure to incorporate improvements in water quality into the output measure will 
seriously depress the resulting productivity growth in the industry. The research reported in 
this paper is directly concerned with the impact of privatization and regulation on 
productivity growth during the period 1985 to 2000 and builds on earlier work. The 
research covers periods both before and after 1989 and does take account of water quality 
improvements. The study is concerned only with the performance of the WaSCs, which 
dominate the industry. 
An input distance function provides an input oriented measure of technical 
efficiency by finding the maximum possible radial contraction of an input vector that can 
occur while still producing output vector. 
The privatized water and sewerage companies are multi-output producers. Recent 
work have emphasized that significant modelling improvements result in both the physical 
volume of water and sewerage output, as well as data on the number of water and sewerage 
customers, are modelled as outputs. Such specification is appropriate if we consider that 
there are distinct output characteristics associated with the physical volume of water supply 
and sewerage treatment, as opposed simply to the provision of connections to water and 
sewerage network customers. Moreover, the input requirements of providing network 
access to an additional water or sewerage customer are substantially different from the 
input requirements of delivering additional water or sewerage treatment services to an 
existing customer. It is similarly appropriate to model an integrated water and sewerage 
utility as a multiple output producer of connections with water customers, connections with 
sewerage customers, physical water supply, and physical sewerage treatment load, and this 
approach is followed in this paper. 
Each WASC’s WATER QUALITY INDEX, is defined as the ratio of the average 
percentage of each WASC’s water supply zones that are compliant with key water quality 
parameters, relative to the average compliance percentage for England and Wales in 1990. 
Turning to SEWERAGE QUALITY, a weighted average of river quality and bathing 
quality relative to the quality level for all England and Wales in 1990 was chosen as the 
best available proxy. In principle, these indices or transformations of them could be 
included as exogenous factors influencing input requirements and/or relative efficiency. 
Their CAPITAL STOCK variable is based on the modern equivalent asset estimation of the 
replacement cost of net tangible fixed assets, as provided in each WASC’s regulatory 
accounts for the years 1990 to 2000. 
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As with all variables employed in this paper, the need to employ consistent data for 
both the pre and post privatization period limited the choice of potential exogenous factors. 
Nevertheless, it was possible to identify several potential z-factors with consistent data for 
the entire 1985-2000 periods. The final model specification included four of these. These 
are the PROPORTION OF WATER ABSTRACTIONS FROM UNDERGROUND 
SOURCES, the RATIO OF TRADE EFFLUENT LOADS TO RESIDENT 
POPULATION, BATHING WATER INTENSITY, and the PROPORTION OF 
METERED CONNECTED WATER PROPERTIES.  
The PROPORTION OF WATER ABSTRACTIONS FROM UNDERGROUND 
SOURCES allows controlling for substantial differences in water supply and the resulting 
impact on input requirements. Underground water sources will require greater treatment 
costs. Similarly, data on TRADE EFFLUENT intensity should capture differences in the 
relative intensity of industrial effluent treatment, which might have a significant influence 
on sewerage treatment input requirements. Greater industrial effluent treatment can be 
expected to result in higher input requirements. 
The results suggest that while privatization and the imposition of RPI+K regulation 
was meant to stimulate efficiency improvements, the combination of transitional efficiency 
declines probably attributable to reorganization at privatization, as well as initially lax price 
controls imposed at privatization to assist a successful sale, meant that by the year 2000 
efficiency levels in the water and sewerage industry had not recovered to their level at 
privatization. 
Saal and Reid (2004) examined how both economic and environmental regulation in 
the English and Welsh water and sanitation sector has influenced productivity growth in the 
industry. Saal and Reid (2004), employed a quality adjusted quasi-fixed capital trans-
logarithmic variable cost function to provide estimates of average annual operating cost 
(OPEX) productivity growth for English and Welsh water and sewerage companies 
(WaSCs). In order to analyse quality, as well as the significant tightening of price cap 
regulation after 1995, they also developed a framework within which standard productivity 
measures can be employed to analyse these issues.  
In order to estimate WaSC OPEX productivity growth rates it is employed a quasi-
fixed capital translog model of operating costs (OPEX). The quasi-fixed nature of water 
industry assets makes quasi-fixed variable cost models more appropriate, but such models 
are less frequent in the literature. 
The generic model includes the standard input price (W), output (Y) capital (K) and 
time (t) variables and interactions between these variables. However, it also includes the 
less standard hedonic (H) variables, which are assumed to be exogenous conditioning 
factors such as network characteristics, environmental, and/or hedonic characteristics, 
measured in levels. These variables are included to take into account characteristics other 
than outputs, prices, and capital stocks, which may have a significant influence on OPEX 
costs, but can also be assumed to be outside of full WaSC managerial control. 
As economic theory suggests that cost functions should be homogenous of degree 
one in input prices, it is necessary to impose this homogeneity onto the system of equations. 
This is accomplished by estimating the above system after dropping one cost share 
equation, and one set of input price interaction terms. This imposition of homogeneity 
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requires that the input prices and variable cost variables must be divided by the dropped 
input price before taking logarithms. Secondly, they employ another standard technique of 
trans-logarithmic modelling, which is to normalize the data about its full sample mean 
before estimating the model.  
Data for LABOUR PRICES (W1) was sourced directly from the statutory accounts 
of the appointed water companies, with the average nominal price for labour inputs 
computed as total salaries and remunerations divided by full time equivalent employees. 
Given its definition as total OPEX costs less labour costs, OTHER INPUT COSTS reflects 
a composite set of heterogeneous inputs. Given its heterogeneous nature, imputing a price 
for this category of input is difficult. A PRICE INDEX FOR OTHER INPUTS (W2) is 
constructed as a unit cost of other inputs relative to an aggregate output index, which 
captures the relative quantity of both water service and sewerage service outputs. 
Regarding hedonic variables, the purpose of their inclusion is to control for 
exogenous influences on OPEX during the sample period. Several alternative hedonic 
variables were rejected from the specification due to statistical insignificance and are 
therefore not further discussed in the main text. These included DISTRIBUTION LOSSES 
(leakage), the NUMBER OF METERED PROPERTIES, the NUMBER OF PROPERTIES 
AT RISK OF SEWERAGE FLOODING, TRADE EFFLUENT VOLUMES, and the 
VOLUMES OF WATER FROM UNDERGROUND SOURCES. The first two hedonic 
measures were adopted to measure the substantial increase in drinking water environmental 
quality over the 1993-2003 period. A relative measure of DRINKING WATER QUALITY 
Q1 was first calculated by employing data to determine the percentage of a WaSC’s 
drinking water supply zones that were fully compliant with 16 different drinking water 
standards
8. Q1 times the water supply population is the defined qualitative variable H1. 
The substantial program of capital investment since WaSC privatization has in large 
part been concentrated on the extension of secondary level sewage treatment to meet EU 
environmental standards. Therefore, trends in secondary treatment should provide a 
measure of the improvement in environmental quality as WaSCs have invested to meet 
rising standards. The ESTIMATED POPULATION RECEIVING AT LEAST 
SECONDARY TREATMENT OF SEWERAGE is H2. 
A similar quality related hedonic variable is the NUMBER OF CONNECTED 
WATER SERVICE PROPERTIES WITH WATER PRESSURE BELOW THE 
REFERENCE LEVEL set by OFWAT (H3). Improvements in water pressure require 
substantial expenditure on leakage control and improved system design and management. 
Moreover, improved pressure was an important quality parameter pursued by OFWAT in 
the years following privatisation. 
As the previous literature was suggested that controlling for connections is 
important when estimating water industry cost functions, they have therefore included both 
the NUMBER OF CONNECTED SEWERAGE PROPERTIES (H4) and NUMBER OF 
CONNECTED WATER SERVICE PROPERTIES (H5) as hedonic variables. 
                                                 
8 Coliforms, faecal coliforms, colour, turbidity, odor, taste, hydrogen ion, nitrate, nitrite, aluminum, iron, 
manganese, lead, PAH, Trihalomethanes, and total pesticides. 
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The final hedonic variables to be included in the specification are SEWERAGE 
SERVICE DENSITY (H6) defined as population per kilometre of sewer, and WATER 
SERVICE DENSITY (H7) defined as population per kilometre of water main. Alternative 
density variables defined as POPULATION PER SERVICE AREA were found to be 
statistically insignificant, thereby indicating that the distribution of population along service 
mains is a more appropriate density measure. 
Saal and Parker (2005) pointed out that in its 1994, 1999 and 2004 price reviews, 
OFWAT has assessed the performance of companies by employing a set of cross sectional 
models at the function level (water distribution, water treatment, etcetera) and then 
aggregating these functional models in order to generate separate assessments of a 
company’s performance in water operations and sewerage operations. Moreover, in 
assessing the performance of water operations, OFWAT has implicitly assumed that the 
water and sewerage operations of a WASC are fully separable. This is because it has 
assessed the water operations of both WaSCs and WoCs against jointly estimated common 
frontiers.  
Saal and Parker (2005) employed a quality-adjusted input distance function and 
stochastic frontier techniques to estimate productivity growth rates for the water operations 
of England and Wales’ water and sewerage industry. While an output distance function is 
built on the assumption that managers wish to maximize output usage for given inputs, an 
input distance function assumes that managers wish to minimize input usage given current 
output levels. The results suggest that there is substantial scope for employing these 
techniques in assessing water operations efficiency. These methods also allow productivity 
growth to be decomposed so as to account for the impact of technical change, efficiency 
change, and scale change on performance. The results also indicate that within the context 
of a panel stochastic frontier model, it is statistically inappropriate to assume that WaSCs 
and WoCs share a common frontier. Such an assumption would result in biased estimates 
of productivity growth and efficiency. The study is motivated by the desire to determine if 
OFWAT’s current approach (of assessing the water operations of both WaSCs and WoCs 
against jointly estimated common cross sectional frontiers), can be extended to the panel 
assessment of overall water operations performance.  
 
III-Italy 
Fraquelli and Moiso (2005), analysed the ongoing reform of the Italian water sector, with 
particular attention to the industry cost efficiency and to the assessment of scale economies 
at ATO level, by estimating a stochastic cost frontier. The ATOs (Ambiti Territoriali 
Ottimali) should be local optimum size areas defined by regional bodies, where the 
management of water and sewerage services is unified. They analysed 18 ATOs through 
their operational and strategic planning which provides the management guidelines for the 
next 20 years. In particular, Fraquelli and Moiso (2005) estimated a trans-logarithmic cost 
frontier to assess the behaviour of returns to scale, the inefficiency score and the impact of 
network characteristics. Galli law mandated the creation of 91 ATOs, where the 
management of water service must be unified. A vertical integrated structure is supposed to 
minimize the sum of production and transaction costs: in each territorial area the same firm 
will manage the water and sewerage service and wastewater treatment. The main problems 
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in the Italian water system were: service fragmentation, low efficiency and low size, 
insufficient water supply (occurring during summertime); low quality of water and services 
and, consequently, level of customer satisfaction; tariffs (in many cases not even covering 
costs and among the lowest in Europe. The union and the strong reduction of some 13,000 
firms should guarantee the minimum efficient size, a rationalization of investments and a 
better coordination of joint costs of water service. 
The ATO management has to be assigned, through a competitive bidding, to one 
private or mixed private-public firm. Public firms can maintain their concession without a 
competitive bidding, but cannot compete for other ATOs; the private company continues to 
operate up to the expiry of its own concession. The major problem still remains the size of 
the ATOs and the size of the firms inside them. In every single ATO the service is managed 
by a large number of units. The goals are based on the so-called Piano d’Ambito, a plan 
implemented by single utility firms under the control of the Water Authorities. The Piano 
finds and faces the peculiar problems of each ATO. It also includes the financial plan and 
the tariff systems. Tariffs must cover operational and financial costs and, through a price 
cap mechanism, stimulate the efficiency of utility companies. 
The empirical research is based on a thirty-year unbalanced panel data of business 
plans of 18 ATOs at national level (out of 62 available), over a period of 20-30 years, for a 
total of 407 observations. In order to verify both scale economies and inefficiency, was 
estimated a stochastic cost frontier. The presence of scale economies gives a measure of the 
potential cost reduction related to the increase of the size. On the other hand, the measure of 
the inefficiency is a quality index of the resources allocation provided by each ATO. The 
results show that –on average- inefficiency score is about 21%, partially explained by 
network characteristics. On the other hand, the presence of relevant scale economies 
suggests that a reduction in local fragmentation could improve the supply structure of water 
service in Italy.  
The trans-logarithmic specification is a flexible function form, imposing no a priori 
restriction on production technology. In particular, a stochastic cost frontier approach was 
adopted, enabling to analyse the evolution of inefficiency over time and between firms, 
distinguishing cost reductions induced by technical change from those deriving from 
efficiency improvements. This methodology computes the cost deviation from the best 
practice frontier per year and per firm, and this deviation is attributed to both inefficiency 
and other random effects. 
In the study, the attention is focused on the Italian tariff computation model. This is 
based on the operational costs added to the financial cost of the capital (equity and debts) 
with the deduction of a price cap improvement of efficiency term. The output is measured 
by the TOTAL VOLUME OF WATER DELIVERED. Input factors mainly consist in 
LABOUR, ENERGY, MATERIALS, SERVICES and CAPITAL. The TOTAL COST 
depends on the AMOUNT OF WATER DELIVERED, the PRICE OF LABOUR, 
ENERGY PRICE and MATERIALS, SERVICES and CAPITAL. In addition to those 
variables, were included NETWORK LENGTH and an indicator of LEVEL OF LOSSES 
as output characteristics. A TIME TREND variable accounts for technological progress.  
The LABOUR PRICE was obtained by dividing the TOTAL LABOUR COST by 
the NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES, the ENERGY PRICE by dividing the TOTAL 
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EXPENSES IN ELECTRICITY by the WATER INTRODUCED IN THE NETWORK, the 
PRICE OF MATERIAL, SERVICES AND CAPITAL by dividing its cost by the network 
length. The DUMMY FOR LOSSES takes value one when in the ATO the volume of 
losses (introduced water minus distributed water) is greater than the average of the whole 
sample. The average value was considered as reference given that the losses are a structural 
phenomenon in the water industry. The model was estimated by ML method in order to 
simultaneously estimate the parameters of the stochastic cost frontier and the variables of 
the inefficiency model.  
The model that better explains the relative efficiency of firms is linear between the u 
term and the POPULATION DENSITY, obtained by dividing the NUMBER OF 
RESIDENTS by the NETWORK LENGTH. DENSITY may have ambiguous effects on 
costs inefficiency. A higher value of this variable is expected to reduce cost inefficiency 
because it is cheaper to distribute water of not extensively scattered customers. On the other 
hand, a higher density may create congestion problems. All variables were normalized to 
their sample mean and are in natural logarithm. All signs of the first order parameters are as 
expected. Variable costs are in a very weak relation with the time variable: there is not an 
annual cost reduction due to technical progress. As expected, for smaller firms the 
economies of output density are very high. As the delivered water increases, the value 
decreases but remains always up to 1. The results show the presence of strong economies of 
scale, that fall up to about 1 million inhabitants. In the Italian water sector the average size 
of the ATOs is two thirds of the former. The results suggest that existing ATOs can obtain 
cost reduction through further mergers, approaching the optimum size. The efficiency 
evolution over time was investigated and it was found evidence of increasing inefficiency 
rates followed by decreasing rates over time. The results show a positive relationship 
between inefficiency and population density, evidence of possible congestion problems in 
the ATOs with a higher density. 
 
IV-Asia 
The cost frontier for Asia estimated by Estache and Rossi (1999) comprises 50 firms from a 
database provided by the Asian Development Bank for 1995. The final model used to 
calculate the efficiency measures related COSTS against SALARIES, CLIENTS, 
DENSITY OF POPULATION, CONNEXIONS, STRUCTURE –RESIDENTIAL SALES 
ON TOTAL SALES-, quality measured as NUMBER OF HOURS OF WATER 
AVAILABILITY AND A DUMMY FOR CONVENTIONAL TREATMENT OF THE 
RAW WATER. The methodology used was COLS. It was also calculated a regression by 
ML, with similar results. The consistency of the measures was evaluated. 
In order to assess consistency, they used Bauer (1998) criteria: 
1)  The efficiency measures generated by the various frontiers methods 
must yield similar averages and standard deviations. 
2)  They must rank firms in a similar way. 
3)  They must identify the same best and worse firms. 
4)  They must be reasonably consistent over time and should not vary 
significantly from year to year. 
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5)  They must be reasonable consistent with the results expected from 
the developments in the industry. 
6)  They must be reasonably consistent with other performance measures 
used by the regulators (like partial productivity measures). 
Estache and Rossi (2002), advanced over they previous work. The data provides 
comparable information for all the companies, but just for one year. They do not contain 
information of the asset base. The estimated function is in line with practice in previous 
studies. Since the only input price available is for labour, an ad hoc cost function was 
estimated. The dependent variable is OPEX. Some environmental variables were included, 
POPULATION DENSITY, the PERCENTAGE OF WATER FROM SURFACE 
SOURCES, the PERCENTAGE OF METERED CONNEXIONS (higher administrative 
costs), and HOURS PER DAY OF WATER AVAILABILITY. Three dummies were 
included: CONCESSION, PRIVATE ADMINISTRATION, and OTHER PRIVATE 
SECTOR PARTICIPATION. The initial model calculated COSTS as a function of 
SALARIES, CLIENTS, CONNEXIONS, PRODUCTION, DENSITY, WATER FROM 
SURFACE SOURCES, QUALITY, METERS, and 5 DUMMIES. For OLS, COLS and 
ML estimates, the signs of the coefficients are as expected. 
 
V-Latin America 
Mobbs and Glennie (2005) developed DEA calculations with ADERASA database for 
2003, relating the ratio of a weighted sum of outputs to a weighted sum of inputs. The 
weights have been calculated to maximize each organisation’s efficiency score. An 
efficiency frontier is derived from the most efficient organizations, and less efficient 
organizations are compared with the frontier. Peer organisations’ are identified for each 
organization not on the frontier. 
A number of models were run. As inputs there were chosen TOTAL AMOUNT 
BILLED and STAFF. As outputs were considered POPULATION SERVED, CLIENTS, 
CONNECTIONS, LENGTH OF MAINS and WATER SOLD. No relationship between 
climate and topography, on one hand, and efficiency, on the other hand, could be found 
from the data. Several of the “least efficient” utilities are in small countries, serving a large 
area. Private utilities tend to have fewer staff than similar public utilities. There does not 
appear to be a strong relationship between the number of people served by a utility and its 
efficiency. Utilities where the sewer network is nearly as big as the water supply network 
tend to be more efficient, perhaps indicating the economies made possible by shared 
functions such as billing. Regression analysis was tried as an alternative, but did not add 
any useful information to that obtained from DEA. Monetary measures have been 
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V-1 Brazil
9
Crampes et al (1997) estimated a cost function for Brazilian water sector. They applied the 
same variables of the Stewart (1993) study and also include the VOLUME OF WATER 
PRODUCED, the RATIO BETWEEN THE VOLUME OF BILLED WATER AND 
PRODUCED WATER, and the RATIO BETWEEN CONNEXIONS AND STAFF. They 
used weighted least squares. 
Moreira and Fonseca (2005), suggest evaluation criteria for productivity estimation 
arising from DEA and SFA. They named their criteria “Classification Error Index” (CEI). 
They made an empirical investigation to compare those models and a Bayesian approach to 
the SFA model in order to derive the expected value of productivity. Their results show that 
the greater CEIs (worst results) are related with variable returns to scale when DEA is used, 
with small samples when SFA is used, and with lower ratio between productivity and error 
variance for both models. 
Tupper and Resende (2003) quantified the relative efficiencies of state-level water 
and sewage companies in Brazil during 1996-2000. Relative efficiency scores obtained by 
DEA indicate that sub-optimal performance is salient for some utilities. The 
complementary between DEA and econometric procedures is explored. The comparison of 
actual costs and reimbursed values defined by the comparative efficiency analysis makes 
salient different patterns across the different utilities and the possibility of important cost 
savings. In contrast with the majority of utilities in Brazil, the water and sewage sector has 
not been privatised and remains structured around a set of state and municipal firms. The 
paper also discuss the feasibility of implementing yardstick schemes. In order to reach 
those goals, they were combined the flexible relative efficiency measurement approach of 
DEA with econometric estimation.  
In Brazil there are 27 state companies. Among these, there are 25 companies with 
mixed ownership (but public management). In 2000, together these 27 companies supplied 
around 3823 municipalities (69% of the total of Brazil). The main data source was provided 
by the annual diagnoses generated by the SNIS. The referred report on state services has 
been continuously published since 1995. The authors had to confine our sample period to 
1996-2000. The present study needed to focus on 20 of the 27 existing companies given 
incomplete or non-existent data. The inputs and outputs selected for the analysis are as 
                                                 
9 In the Brazilian case there is a substantial deficit in water and sewage provision that had reached 9% and 
51% of the population respectively in 1996. In 1971, a national plan for water and sewage provision in urban 
areas was created. Among the targets established by the plan there was a well-defined intention of stimulating 
state companies instead of municipal companies. The regulatory framework involved traditional ROR and 
aimed mostly at the financial sustainability of the sector. Tariffs charged by the state companies during the 
plan involved a system of cross-subsidies between different classes of consumers so as to make the coverage 
of low-income population tenable. By the same logic, the cross subsidies scheme was extended to 
municipalities with lower revenue potential. In that case, the adoption of a single state-level tariff (based on 
global costs) established a cross-subsidy mechanism form municipalities of higher revenue to those of smaller 
revenues or higher costs. The tariff model based on cross-subsidies had important role on accelerating 
infrastructure investment for low-income localities, even though the deficit remains high. The conflict of 
jurisdiction between state and municipalities remain until the present. The problem arises when the state 
companies operate in an area beyond the territorial limits of a particular municipality. It is possible, that part 
of the inefficiency sources might be corrected in the future. The co-existence of several regulatory institutions 
at a more local level, however, is an obstacle for the establishment of a proper regulatory framework. 
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follows: for inputs were selected LABOUR EXPENSES, OPERATIONAL COSTS AND 
OTHER COSTS, and for outputs, WATER PRODUCED, TREATED SEWAGE, 
POPULATION SERVED-WATER and POPULATION SERVED-TREATED SEWAGE. 
Additional control variables are later introduced in the econometric analysis of the 
determinants of efficiency. Even though the discrimination among the relative efficiency 
scores is not overwhelming, one can detect companies with salient sub-optimal 
performance that may motivate the introduction of efficiency-inducing regulatory 
mechanisms. Attending heterogeneity of the regions of the country, there were explored 
some regional factors that are likely to interfere on the determination of productive 
efficiency. Econometric analysis can provide a useful complement to the efficiency 
measurement approach of DEA as joint instrument towards the implementation of yardstick 
schemes. Specifically, were considered as explanatory factors: DENSITY OF WATER 
NETWORK (POPULATION SERVED-WATER DIVIDED BY THE NETWORK 
EXTENSION IN KILOMETERS. Utilities that operate in low density areas are likely to be 
relatively burdened in comparison with utilities that operate in high density areas), 
DENSITY OF THE SEWAGE NETWORK (POPULATION SERVED IN TERMS OF 
SEWAGE CAPTURED DIVIDED BY THE NETWORK EXTENSION), INDEX OF 
WATER LOSSES (VOLUME OF WATER PRODUCED PLUS GROSS IMPORTED 
PLUS TREATED IMPORTED MINUS VOLUME OF CONSUMED WATER, all divided 
by VOLUME OF WATER PRODUCED PLUS GROSS IMPORTED PLUS TREATED 
IMPORTED). The coefficients for density of water and index of losses display the expected 
sign whereas density of sewerage has a counterintuitive sign but the coefficient is not 
statistically significant. 
Sabbioni (2005) used econometric techniques to measure the relative performance 
of water and sewerage utilities in Brazil. Three alternative specifications of a stochastic cost 
frontier were utilized to rank Brazilian firms. The study focuses on parametric approaches 
to estimate key parameters and test the relative importance of variables. 
Sabbioni (2005) utilized the cost function approach as more appropriate, based upon 
the characteristics of the operating environment of water and sewerage utilities, the ability 
to deal with multiple outputs, the lack of endogeneity problems, data availability, and 
technology specification. It was assumed that a water and sewerage utility can maximize its 
profits (or social surplus) by minimizing the cost of producing some exogenously given 
output level, subject to the available technology. The focus is on 2002 data, the most recent 
year with published information, provided 280 observations for the cross-sectional analysis; 
however missing observations reduce the effective size of the sample, depending on the 
variables chosen. 
Three possible specifications for the cost function were constructed. The first results 
consist of specifications that deliberately exclude environmental variables. The R-squared 
for these regressions is higher than 0.90. This set of results consists of three different 
specifications for the cost function: Volumes Model, Population Model and Connections 
Model. Each model has one output variable related to water and one output variable related 
to sewerage (VOLUME  OF WATER PRODUCED and VOLUME OF SEWER 
COLLECTION in the first case, POPULATION SERVED WITH WATER and 
POPULATION SERVED WITH SEWER in the second case, and, WATER 
CONNEXIONS and  SEWER CONNEXIONS in the third case). Regarding the vector of 
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input prices present in all regressions, the variable WAGES was estimated in the usual way, 
as the ratio of total salaries paid divided by the number of workers in the firm. The WAGE 
coefficient is always positive and significant. No matter the choice of outputs, all the 
coefficients are positive and significant in the three regressions.  
Variations of the basic models were evaluated to shed light on the environmental 
issues that may affect the technology of the firms. Environmental variables were tested one 
by one to isolate their effect on the operating cost and evaluate them in detail. Finally, there 
were used: DUMMY FOR PURCHASING OF WATER FROM ANOTHER UTILITY, the 
AVERAGE LITRES OF WATER THAT A HOUSEHOLD CONSUMES in cubic meters 
per month, REGIONAL DUMMIES and VOLUME OF WATER METERED in cubic 
meters. 
To estimate the efficiency level of the regional firms, they were run three stochastic 
cost frontier models. By OLS regressions there were found the significant variables for 
most of the variation in operating cost, but the construction of an efficiency ranking of the 
firms needs to account for both inefficiency and randomness in the error term. Hence there 
were performed three stochastic cost frontier regressions (using ML) with exactly the same 
variables. The error term from these regressions is asymmetric, since it is composed of an 
error term (random noise in the data) and a non-negative term (that specifically accounts for 
the deviation in cost attributable entirely to inefficiency, assumed to follow a half-normal 
distribution). It is shown a strong stability of the value and sign of the coefficients from the 
OLS versions and the stochastic cost frontier versions. All the variables remain highly 
significant, which adds more support for their inclusion in the models. The firms in the 
better and in the worst places are consistently ranked, regardless of which output variable is 
chosen. 
With respect to exogenous factors, it was evaluated the possibility of regional 
influences on operating costs. Hence it was checked the significance of four regional 
dummy variables in the three basic models according to where the firm is located. At first 
glance, there is no evidence that any region affects operating costs in any particular 
direction (at least in all the specifications). Each model was put through the process of 
eliminating the less significant regional variables one by one. Northeast (with negative 
coefficient) and Southeast (with a positive one) were kept in both the population and the 
connections models because of significant effects. The second analysis of exogenous 
factors addresses the constraint that some utilities face when they do not own sufficient 
water to satisfy their demand, and so must purchase water from other firms. There is some 
evidence that it increases operating costs, but the significance of this result is verified only 
for the volumes model. The third set of results concerns the effect of population density on 
operating cost. Counter to the expected, no negative and significant coefficients were found 
for the density variables in the three specifications. Density of water connections was 
significant to the population and connections models and with the expected negative sign. 
Sewerage density proved to be insignificant in all models. The fourth analysis of 
environmental factors was the evaluation of whether water metering has a positive impact 
on operating costs. The results indicate that the volume of water metered has a positive 
effect on operating costs. The result is maintained across the three specifications. The last 
set of regressions with environmental variables test the hypothesis that larger customers 
reduce the operating cost of the firm, addressing issues raised in earlier works regarding 
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residential versus commercial customers even though that distinction is not made in the 
database. Only the volumes model accepts a significant measure of average water 
consumption, which means that the greater the volume of water delivered to a customer, the 
lower the total operating cost for the utility.  
Water losses could certainly explain differences in operating cost across utilities, 
but that is something that should be handled by the management of the company. Mainly 
caused by the inefficient operation of the utility, water losses cannot be considered 
exogenous parameters that affect the available technology of the firm. Because network 
length is considered only partially endogenous, it was not controlled for this variable either.  
 
V-2 Peru 
Berg and Lin (2005), evaluated the consistency of water utility performance rankings for 
Peruvian water utilities. DEA and Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) yield similar 
rankings in this case. The rankings are not highly correlated with those developed by 
Peruvian water regulator SUNASS, based on partial productivity indices. SUNASS 
developed a system of indicators and a benchmarking scheme, composed by nine indicators 
in four areas of efficiency: quality of service (compliance with the residual chlorine rule, 
continuity of service and percentage of water receiving chemical treatment), coverage of 
service attained (water coverage and sewerage coverage), management efficiency 
(operating efficiency, percentage of connections with meters installed and non-payment), 
and managerial finance efficiency (direct costs and other expenses/revenues). Each 
indicator expressed as a percentage is multiplied by its weight (1/9) and added to the 
percentage total per company. 
The Berg and Lin (2005) analysis is for 44 firms from 1996 to 1998. The models 
used as inputs, OPERATING COSTS, WATER LOSSES and the NUMBER OF WATER 
CONNECTIONS. The outputs were VOLUME OF WATER BILLED (because of high 
levels of unaccounted for water), NUMBER OF CUSTOMERS, COVERAGE OF 
SERVICE and CONTINUITY OF SERVICE as quality indicators.  
A disadvantage of the production frontier SFA is that it cannot consider multiple 
inputs and outputs simultaneously. To solve this problem, an input distance function was 
used: it could describe the multiple-input and multiple-output production technology and 
does not require assumptions about the behaviour of the companies. 
In order to avoid the loss of degrees of freedom, a log-linear function was estimated. 
The inputs are NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES, OPERATION COSTS and NUMBER OF 
WATER CONNECTIONS. The outputs are VOLUME OF WATER BILLED, NUMBER 
OF CUSTOMERS, COVERAGE RATIO and CONTINUITY OF SERVICE. All the terms 
have the correct signs: output coefficients are negative and inputs coefficients are positive. 
Lin (2005) examined how the introduction of quality variables affects comparisons 
across utilities. The research presented different specifications of stochastic cost frontiers 
models to illustrate how quality can be incorporated into benchmarking studies. The paper 
examined the performance of the publicly owned water utilities regulated by SUNASS in 
Peru, using data from 1996-2001. This study attempted to determine whether the inclusion 
of quality indicators into the estimations affects the benchmarking results. TOTAL COSTS 
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are calculated from the SUNASS database. The outputs considered are those used in many 
water studies: VOLUME OF WATER BILLED and the NUMBER OF CUSTOMERS. 
Because the former is highly correlated with revenues, it was not included as an output. The 
two input prices are WAGES and CAPITAL PRICE. The WAGES are calculated by 
TOTAL OUTLAYS ON LABOUR DIVIDED BY THE NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES. The 
CAPITAL PRICE can be approximated by ANNUAL CAPITAL OUTLAYS DIVIDED 
BY THE STOCK OF CAPITAL. In this study, capital outlays are approximated by adding 
depreciation and financial cost (interest payments). Either the NETWORK LENGHT or the 
number of WATER CONNEXIONS can be used as the proxy for the stock of capital. 
Because of the lack of data on fuel, chemicals, and power and material costs, the model 
does not impose the restriction of homogeneity of degree one in prices for estimation 
purposes. Four variables are used for quality dimensions: ACCOUNTED FOR WATER 
RATIO, POSITIVE RATE OF CHLORINE TESTS, SERVICE COVERAGE and 
SERVICE CONTINUITY. ACCOUNTED FOR WATER is 1 minus UNACCOUNTED 
FOR WATER RATIO (which includes physical and commercial losses). COVERAGE is 
used as an indicator of service quality, because is a direct measure of water availability to 
citizens in a municipality. A POSITIVE RATE OF CHLORINE TESTS (% of samples 
with satisfactory residual chlorine) and CONTINUITY of service are two of the three 
indicators used by SUNASS to evaluate service quality. An unbalanced panel data sample 
with 198 observations is used in the estimation. The monetary unit variables have been 
deflacted. Different distribution models are tested in the study in order to reduce the impact 
of choosing a specific distribution function arbitrarily. The environmental and quality 
variables are consider either as influencing the efficiency of a firm or as additional outputs 
of the cost function. A TIME TREND was added to capture the technical change. 
Firstly, it was estimated the frontier model without quality variables. All models 
with different error specifications yield similar results. All the coefficient of outputs and 
input prices are significant and consistent with economic theory. The coefficient of the time 
trend variable is insignificant, which suggests the absence of technological change over this 
time period. Next, a panel data conditional mean efficiency model is estimated to check the 
impact of quality indicators on water utility efficiency. Coefficients of output and inputs 
prices are significant and consistent with economic theory. None of four coefficients of 
quality indicators are statistically significant. Therefore, it may not be appropriate to treat 
the quality variables as environmental variables. When the quality variables were treated as 
additional outputs and included in the cost function, they were all significant and consistent 
with economic theory. The results indicate that the quality output variables should be 
included in cost frontier models. 
 
VI-Africa 
Estache and Kouassi (2002) analyzed the determinants of the efficiency levels reached by 
21 African water utilities, through the estimation of a production frontier for the sector. For 
lack of better data, they estimate this production function from an unbalanced panel of data 
for a sample of 21 African water utilities covering the 1995-1997 periods. To contribute to 
the design of reforms, the paper also quantifies the joint effect of various institutional 
sources of inefficiencies, and in particular assesses the costs of the interactions between 
inefficiency and major institutional problems, in particular governance. The measurement 
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of efficiency in the water sector is complicated by the nature of the production process. The 
main justification for the selection of the specification chosen of a water production 
function for Africa is the following. First, in most African countries, the production cost 
structure is not known because of the degree of uncertainty surrounding cost structures is 
relatively high; therefore it is better to estimate a production function rather than a cost 
function. Second, in most classical papers, capital and length of network are two key 
variables; while in the present case, those two variables are highly correlated (multi-co 
linearity issue). That means that one of these two variables should be used but not both of 
them. Third, in the specific context of African countries, the number of connections is a 
very important variable since the average size family is between 7 and 9 for some African 
countries and even more for other (free rider issue). Finally, the variable time trend should 
capture technological impact within the water industry in Africa. 
The authors apply a transformation to the original data and re-estimate the model in 
order to get the GLS estimates. The results are very satisfactory. Out of six explanatory 
variables, four are significant. Results confirm the non-endogeneity of labour as seen from 
the Hausman simultaneity test. The estimation with the GMM has given similar results. 
Note also that the GLS is the favourite due to the absence of correlation between the 
individual effects and the explanatory variables confirmed by the Hausman test. 
For the sample analysed and the period covered, the average performance is only 
54%. The top performers score high at 85 and 83%, which is close to three times the score 
of the bottom performers who score between 30, and 35%. The scale indicator suggests that 
constant return to scale prevails in the water sector in Africa. The rate of technical progress 
turns out that the impact of technology is very limited in the context of water service 
utilities in Africa during the period under analysis. 
Recent studies have shown that institutional factors at the discretion of the 
management as well as environmental factors beyond the control of managers or regulators 
affect water efficiency. Some of the factors cited in the literature are corruption (various 
indices), governance (various indices), and etcetera. This can be tested form the results 
obtained here. The efficiency scores of water utilities are examined using a censored tobit 
model to identify factors influencing inefficiency. The empirical model runs the regression 
between the inefficiency values against a constant, a CORRUPTION INDEX, a 
GOVERNANCE INDEX and a DUMMY FOR PRIVATE OR PUBLIC. An important 
feature of the results is that institutional variables are statistically significant at the five 
percent level; their signs are also as expected. An interpretation of these results 
corroborates the fact that corruption is negatively linked to efficiency while governance is 
positively linked. As a consequence, water utilities should also focus on institutional 
variables when trying to improve their efficiency score. The dummy variable, which 
captures the effect of privatization, is statistically significant at the five percent level. 
 
VII-Australia 
Woodbury and Dollery (2003) attempts to augment the literature on performance 
measurement in Australian local government by using DEA with holistic indices of 
allocative and technical efficiency in NSW municipal water services. It also seeks to 
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incorporate qualitative indicators into efficiency measures. “Best-practice” councils are 
identified and the underlying causes of municipal water service efficiency are analysed. 
In the area of water services, in common with many other public services, the total 
value of a service cannot be adequately assessed in terms of quantitative outputs alone. For 
instance, the physical and chemical quality of the water supplied (water quality) and 
disruptions to supply (reliability) are important qualitative attributes of the final product. 
The age of the infrastructure influences the amount of maintenance required to 
provide continued supply of the service: the type of infrastructure represents the technology 
used and thus the production function faced by the council; raw water quality determines 
how much treatment is required to meet the drinking water guidelines; rainfall affects the 
raw eater quality and so the amount of treatment required; topography influences pumping 
costs and ease of construction works; the corrosiveness of the soil affects the life of 
pipework and thus maintenance to keep the system serviceable; population density 
determines the average amount of pipe required to service each property; seasonal 
variations in populations may require larger capacity infrastructure to meet standards all 
year round; and finally, the industrial activity level can influence the average consumption 
of water. 
Six alternative models were used to compare different ways of incorporating service 
quality measure into the DEA. The use of indicators for separate DEA outputs was 
unsatisfactory since their scale neutrality was inconsistent with the other outputs and inputs. 
The adjustment of quantitative outputs by multiplication with aggregate service quality 
indices provided a superior methodology. Averaging of service quality indicators when 
compiling the aggregate indices was found, not surprisingly, to be less punitive than either 
multiplication of the indices or adopting the minimum index number. However, the 
differences between the more and less punitive alternative models were less than expected. 
 
VIII-Other 
Bhattacharyya et al (1995) studied technical efficiency of rural water utilities, using frontier 
production functions. An indirect production function is developed to model the two-step 
production process of a local government-controlled firm. Data from 26 rural Nevada water 
utilities are used to estimate inefficiency in terms of firm-specific variables. A multistep 
estimation procedure is used instead of single-step maximum likelihood estimation. Model 
selection tests are used to choose the best model. Privately owned utilities are most 
efficient; self-governing water districts are the least efficient. Municipal governments 
operate the most and least efficient utilities. 
Renzetti and Dupont (2003) pursued to critically assess what is known regarding the 
relationship between the ownership and performance of municipal water utilities. Renzetti 
and Dupont (2003) turn to the empirical evidence from the United States, the United 
Kingdom and France. These studies reveal that there is no compelling evidence to date of 
private utilities outperforming public utilities or that privatising water utilities leads to 
unambiguous improvements in performance. However, there is some evidence that public-
private partnerships in these countries may facilitate efficient and sustainable operations. 
The paper concludes that the empirical literature is lacking in conclusive evidence that 
privately owned water utilities are more efficient than comparable publicly owned water 
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utilities. Nonetheless, it is worth remembering that many of the empirical studies do not test 
the predictions of a specific theoretical model for performance differences
10. As a result, it 
is difficult to determine which of the theoretical models predicting the superiority of private 
firms has been rejected. 
 
                                                 
10 Three models could be tested: Principal-agent, Property Rights and Public Choice theories. In a principal-
agent relationship, the task of the owner is to design a contract that provides the manager with the incentive to 
choose the strategy that maximises the owner’s welfare. The challenge for the owner is that, in a world of 
asymmetric information and uncertainty, the managers’ effort cannot be monitored and contracts cannot be 
enforced in a costless manner. A significant issue, then, in comparing public and private ownership is their 
relative efficacy in providing managers with incentives to act consistently with the enterprise’s goals. 
Property rights theory argues that private-sector owners, ad residual claimants, have more clearly defined 
incentives to push for efficient decision-making by managers. The same logic applies to the firm’s creditors 
and also to owners of other firms considering a potential takeover. In contrast, politicians, senior bureaucrats 
and tax-payers have attenuated property rights to the gains associated with improved public-sector agency 
performance and, as a result, have diminished incentives to push for improvements. 
Public choice theory emphasises the potential for inefficient behaviour on the part of public-sector managers 
since they are assumed to act in their own self-interest. 
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